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Abstract 
After regaining its independence, Somaliland made a unitary system of governance in which the constitution 
establishes central government with regional and local governments. where Local governments provide basic 
services as per their capacity. The number of districts, their hierarchy, and boundaries were to be [and are still to 
be] defined by law. Donors and UN Agencies introduced Joint Program for Local Governance and Decentralization 
(JPLG) which has been operational in Somaliland since 2008, supporting decentralization. Nonetheless, 
decentralization efforts in Somaliland, particularly those pertaining to fiscal affairs face many challenges. The 
main aim of this study is to explore key fiscal decentralization challenges and available options for a better fiscal 
decentralization system. There is unnecessary increase of districts based on tribal political motivations many of 
them with limited taxable economic base and their dependency on electoral districts in elections. Subsidy 
allocations to local governments are not based on assessed physical and socioeconomic factors and have not been 
predictable nor fairly distributed. Districts with custom posts receive municipal tax revenue which raises local 
government budget over comparable districts. unless addressed with equalization funds such budget inequality 
among local governments in the process of decentralization will have a negative disparity in the services provided 
and livelihoods among districts.  Other challenges include poor legal framework and limited institutional capacity. 
However, Somaliland should rethink the type of decentralization to adopt, review policies and regulatory 
frameworks applied to subnational governments to reflect best practices.  
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1. Introduction 
Decentralization and local government reforms became popular in development trends and practices in the 1990s 
(Hartmann, 2008). Many sources defined that decentralization involves the transfer of power, responsibilities, and 
finance management from the central government to sub-national levels of government.  
According to Kulipossa, (2008) decentralization takes various forms across countries, majorly due to variances in 
cultures, institutions, and fiscal characteristics. However, all remain susceptible to similar problems that undermine 
successful implementation. 
As a subset of decentralization, fiscal decentralization refers to the empowerment of subnational governments in 
terms of tax collection and spending (Oommen, 2006) and it remains important under public finance theory (Oates, 
2006). Furthermore, Theorists of fiscal federalism argue that appropriate functions and finance of local 
governments makes efficiency that maximizes the welfare of local communities (Bird, 1995), decentralizing fiscal 
powers to subnational governments has been a response to efforts demanding democratization (Defere, 2018). 
Nevertheless, the economic rationale is not easy as assumed under different concepts of public goods (Oates, 2006). 
Fiscal decentralization is seen as the easiest dimension of decentralization which highly proliferated in the 1990s. 
However it has been witnessed that central government agencies remain reluctant to decentralize to subnational 
governments. On the other hand, subnational governments are not politically, administratively, and technically 
prepared to use additional given resources (Smoke, 2000).  
1.1 Theoretical Underpinnings 
Apart from the approach taken in implementing decentralization, a major stamping block is a modality chosen; 
deconcentrating, delegation, or devolution. (Bernard Dafflon, Thierry Maddies, 2013), while the issue of 
appropriate fiscal assignment between different levels of government has been widely debated (Young, 2002). 
Throughout the literature, arguments in favor of decentralization built on economic efficiency and reduction of 
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regional income disparity. According to Hartmann (2008), decentralization mitigates conflicts as it allows for 
political participation and inclusion, improves national integration by harmonizing policies and service delivery. 
(Elmi, 2014) also indicated internal drivers for decentralization in Somalia to be grievance from the periphery, 
mistrust between clans, whereas donor community poses as an external driver.  
However, decentralization may post a threat to fiscal discipline with potential macro-fiscal risks (Hobdari et al., 
2018), other arguments indicate fiscal decentralization leads to inequities because of imbalances in sources of taxes 
and disparity in regions (Alam, 2019). There are also risk of whether decentralization of fiscal powers in terms of 
expenditure and taxing can potentially undermine fiscal policy and monetary policy which are pillars of 
macroeconomic management (Defere, 2018). 
The issue of reforming fiscal relations between levels of government has been an important fiscal policy for most 
African states where many of them have decentralized delivery of some goods and services(Young, 2002).  
Smoke (2012) critically argued some countries with political commitment did not reach decentralization system 
they thought about and proposed to reflect upon decentralization prerequisites as a basic element. 
Ethiopia and Kenya are among the countries that took decentralization reforms that devolved power, 
responsibilities, and resources from central government to subnational governments. Such decentralizations in 
these countries are underpinned by constitutional amendment. For Ethiopia there were two waves of 
decentralization reforms, one from federal government to regional government, and onther from regional 
governments to districts (known as wareda) (Sullivan & Dutkowsky, 2013) 
The IMF listed reforms in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa as the most advanced fiscal decentralization in sub-
Saharan Africa, according to their share of expenditure at subnational governments (Hobdari, Nguyen, Dell’Erba, 
& Ruggiero, 2018). However, Alam (2019) argued local government in Ethiopia are not practicing fiscal 
decentralization as they largely use monetary funds on recurrent costs.  
2.0 Research Methods 
Though fiscal decentration -aside from the theoretical conceptualizations that are available in literature- is borne 
to various physical challenges, the post-conflict nature of Somaliland that is characterized by total ruin institutional 
capabilities and structures that remain under construction for the entirety of its short lifespan pose as a new 
theoretical frontier that is yet to be explored. Its is quite unknown how the new political settlement of Somaliland 
(post independence from Somalia and the United Kingdom) shaped the theoretical governance structural standards 
that are available in the international arena. Nevertheless, this papers’ major outlook is to analyze and understand 
the state of fiscal decentralizations in Somaliland and the major challenges that are to be expected when 
implementing a wide scale decentralization in a post conflict arena, and finally, the remedies and recommendations 
required for a healthier implementation strategies and how the identified loop holes that were previously un 
accounted can be filled.  
Using different types of data collection tools, the study covered decentralization sector ministries, local 
governments implementing decentralized services under the program of JPLG, Association of Local Governments 
Authorities (ALGASL), technical staff in decentralization reforms, respective local staff of involved UN Agencies 
based in Hargeisa.  
Targeted key informants including mayors, director generals of Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Interior, Ministry 
of Public Works Land and Housing, Ministry of Transport and Roads Development, Director of Association for 
Local Governments for Somaliland (ALGASL) with prepared closed and open-ended questionnaires. The 
Researchers also conducted Focus Group Discussions for technical staff from concerned institutions (ministries, 
local governments, UN agencies) to deeply discuss the subject matter of the study. Furthermore, desk reviews of 
available material, including white papers and data from implementing agencies and concerned ministries formed 
the bulk of the structural backing required to cement conceptual understandings and analytical emphases for the 
study.  
3.1 Overview of Somaliland Fiscal Decentralization 
Like any other unitary government, the constitution of Somaliland does not empower subnational governments 
but lays subordinate level of governance. While federal governments have subnational governments empowered 
by a constitution. After regaining its independence, Somaliland restored the state institutions including sub-
national authorities. The Government is in three-tier- formation design, the central government, regions, and local 
governments. The structure of the Government as set by the Somaliland constitution is ‘regions and districts in 
which the number, their hierarchy and boundaries are described by law.  
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The success of development agendas and democratic governance depends on participation of local communities 
in decision making in regards to the issues directly affecting their lives (Kim, 2019). The idea of decentralizing 
basic social services to local governments has been constitutional in Somaliland, depending upon their ability to 
do so. However, these basic services are usually provided by central government ministries and agencies for 
reasons including limited capacity and fiscal constraints in local governments.  
Decentralization of many developing countries is characterized by administrative and fiscal challenges in relation 
to revenue raising and expenditure authority  (Haas, 2017), similarly Somaliland central government transfers 
different types of funds to local governments, namely; local governments subsidy, funds for decentralized services 
of education and health which are pilot in number of districts, and Local Development Fund as part of Joint 
Program for Local governance. These intergovernmental transfers as part of fiscal decentralization face 
tremendous institutional challenges. Both local governments and central government institutions are cribled by 
barriers in pursuing activities related to funds transfers. 
Joint Program for Local Governance and Decentralization (JPLG) has been working in Somaliland since 2008 
supporting local governments in capacity building, development and governance, and is supported by donors 
including the European Commission, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and UK Aid. JPLG currently works closely with 
eight local governments (Hargeisa, Gabiley, Borama, Berbera, Sheikh, Burao, Odweine and Zaylac) through the 
respective Central Government ministries for promoting capacity of local governments to provide equitable 
services to communities (Simkin, 2016). The program placed emphasis on supporting local governments reforms 
and capacity building, organizational structures, accountability, regulations and policies (UNDP, C2 Annual 
Report). With the help of this program decentralization policy has been developed in 2013 and approved by the 
cabinet in 2014. The strategy pointed out the presence of reluctance and confusion of central government ministries 
over the roles and responsibilities of central government ministries and local governments.  
Decentralization is fragmented across three different reform processes; the Public Financial Management, Civil 
Service, and Decentralization (Somaliland Fiscal Decentralization Strategy, 2016). Fiscal Decentralization 
Strategy was set by the JPLG with Ministry of Interior whereas PFM Strategy which is supported by the World 
Bank has fiscal decentralization parts for local governments. 
4.0 Challenges and Shortcomings for Sound Fiscal Decentralization System 
4.1 Proliferation of Appointed Districts and Interdependency Among Local Governments 
Though constitution clearly stipulated that local governments provide basic services according to their ability, the 
central government has always been providing goods and services mainly due to fiscal constraints and lower 
institutional capacity of local governments. The Constitution of Somaliland sets structures of government in 
regions and districts in which the hierarchy and boundaries shall be described by law. As per Law No. 23/2002, 
upgrading and downgrading of districts is by law dependent on assessment of certain known criteria but it has 
never been enforced in such a manner.   
This table below shows the number and different grades of districts in the Law No. 23/2002. 
Table 1 number and different grades of districts in Law No. 23/20002002 









Awdal  1 1 2 1 5 
Marodijeh 2 0 2 6 10 
Sahil 1 0 1 3 5 
Togdher 1 2 0 3 6 
Sool 1 0 3 2 6 
Sanag 1 2 3 4 10 
Total 7 5 11 19 42 
Percentages 16.6% 11.9% 26.2% 45.2% 100% 
Source: (Mal, 2017) 
23 districts of grade A, B, and C are known as electoral districts due to their district council being  appointed by 
democratic vote. There are 19 grade D districts in the Law No. 23/2002 which require  border demarcations to 
become electoral districts but now are under the authority of the Minister of Interior who appoints mayor/chairman, 
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deputy, and district executive secretaries for them.  
Beyond these 19 grade D districts in the law, there have been a growing number of appointed districts by 
subsequent presidents in Somaliland that add up to 59 grade D districts (bringing the new total of grade D districts 
in the newly amended version of law 23/2002 to 78 districts). The appointment of these new districts that break 
away from their parent district have almost been politically motivated and was primarily founded on tribalism and 
tribal political settlement boundaries.   
Table 2;  number and different grades of districts in the Law No. 23/2019 (new version) 









Awdal  1 1 2 8 12 
Marodijeh 2 0 2 15 19 
Sahil 1 0 1 6 8 
Togdher 1 2 0 19 22 
Sool 1 0 3 17 21 
Sanag 1 2 3 13 19 
Total 7 5 11 78 101 
Percentages 6.9% 4.95% 10.89% 77.23% 100% 
Law 23/2019 
These grade D districts are independent as well as symbiotic on their electoral parent district (A,B, or C); they are 
autonomous from the management of its main electoral district in terms of taxes and management however they 
are part of the main (parent) district during elections. These small districts are unlikely to cover recurrent costs and 
deliver social services because of low taxable economic base which consequently bring about administrative cost 
burdens. These numerous grade D districts are operational but the newly approved law of local governments 
proposed that they should only be approved upon receiving positive feedback from assessment and after charting 
border demarcations.  
Programs in JPLG such as decentralized services of education and health, and the Local Development Fund (LDF) 
projects, are primarily based on electoral districts which again notionally encompass the newly break-away 
districts. Some of the Mayors of these electoral districts sometimes don’t consider rural peripheries- where major 
break-away districts are situated- due to their claim independent of and do not collect tax revenues due the presence 
of a ministry appointed mayor.   
throughout the previous decade prior to the decentralization efforts, two parallel major phenomena took precedence 
over the local governments’ contexts. Firstly, many local governments experienced increased fiscal positions in 
terms of raises to their tax base. Re-urbanizations that were brought by the national nation rebuilding strategies 
and the peace process that successfully reoriented the country to mass de-militarization and democratization 
process, culminated to the increments of urban dwellers population, hence also increase the tax collected by the 
local governments. However, all legal regulatory frameworks that were to define the roles and responsibilities of 
local governments had a shallow and vague description of functional assignments and responsibilities. Creating a 
gap in the roles assigned to the local council while tax revenues rose up. As per this logic, improvement in districts 
fiscal space and legal gap caused major community demands to concentrated around a narrow part of the wider 
municipal responsibilities such as sanitation, roads and infrastructure, but majority of basic services such as 
education and health were neglected and are still in the void accountability.  
4.2 Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers; Current Complications and Future Consequences 
In a decentralized budget,districts are often characterized by responsibility-resource gap that is to be financed by 
higher level of government (central or federal) bridging the gap with additional transfers such as additional grants, 
formula-based grant etc (Bernard Dafflon, Thierry Maddies, 2013). In Somaliland, Government allocates 12.5% 
of custom duty (known as subsidy) for local governmentsIts introduction dates back to early years of state building 
where there were check points taking taxes in almost every district. When these checkpoints were removed, it was 
decided to budget this percentage and distribute to local governments based on assessment made at that time based 
on number of shipped trucks destined to each local government. At that time, this allocation was made by law 
12/2000 stated only seven districts with their allocated percentages; Hargeisa (51.26%), Burao (21.39%), Gabiley 
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(9.87%), Borama (9.86%), Sheikh (3.75%), Seyla (2.18%), Baki (1.69%), nevertheless, these allocations went 
through changes by different Ministers of Interior.  
Table 3 Comparison of subsidy allocation in law 12/2000 and current practice 
Local government Grade Law 12/2000 Current practice 
Hargeisa A 51% 30% 
Burao A 21% 12% 
Gabilay A 10% 6% 
Borama A 10% 6% 
Berbera A 0% 5% 
Sheikh C 4% 2% 
Zaila B 2% 1% 
Baki C 2% 1% 
Odweine B 0% 1% 
Other Grade A A 0% 17% 
Other Grade B B 0% 2% 
Other Grade C C 0% 7% 
Grade D D 0% 14% 
Other D (unapproved by 
parliament 
D 0% 0% 
Total  100% 100% 
Source: Ministry of Interior, 2018 
The National Decentralization Policy approved by Somaliland cabinet in 2014 outlines that “Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Transfers: The determination of intergovernmental transfers will be based on objective and transparent 
criteria and consideration of the differences in the classification of the local government, geographic and physical 
factors, populations, and socio-economic conditions”. The intergovernmental fiscal transfer or Subsidy (locally 
known as Kabka) has never been based on known factors and eligible assessment criteria for allocations. Subsidy 
is also highly unpredictable, which is detrimental to local governments early planning and financing projects. 
The Ministry of Interior appoints a councilor composed of mayor, deputy mayor and executive secretary for 
districts that have no electoral council. According to Yusuf & Bradbury (2010) most of these grade D districts 
largely depend on central government in terms of subsidy and challenged by their lower staff capacity, lack of 
democratic mandate, and mostly are not self-sustaining due to their inadequate taxable economic base. Through 
this study almost all local governments visited raised concerns about lack of predictability and transfer of subsidy. 
Similarly, they posed that 50% of the total subsidy budget has been cut and re-taken by the central government 
shown as revenue in the national budget.  
Besides not being implemented, the newly version of law for Regions and Districts Administration Law No. 
23/2019 article 89 (2) states that 12.5% of the national budget shall be allocated to districts as shown in the 
following table.  
Table 4; Subsidy allocations of law 23/2019 
No. Grade of District Allocation 
(Percentage%) 
1.  Grade A 6% 
2.  Grade B 2% 
3.  Grade C 3% 
4.  Grade D 1.5% 
 12.5% 
Law No. 23/2019 
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Another major source of revenue is the municipal tax from customs for districts with custom posts.  
Table 5 Districts and Municipal Tax Revenue 
Grade No of districts  Percent of 
Municipal Tax 
Revenue 
Average per district 
A 7 71% 10% 
B 5 4% 1% 
C 11 10% 1% 
D 19 14% 1% 
D 56 0% 0% 
Total 42 100% 2% 
Source: ODI assessment, 2016 with Author’s calculations  
As shown in this above table very small number of local governments receive customs municipal tax revenue, 
which creates disparity in local governments budgets. Such local governments with municipal tax revenue from 
custom posts allocated more funds for basic services of education and health than other comparable local 
governments.  As decentralization continues, the role of local governments in participating basic services provision 
increases, however, budget disparity among local governments could lead to budget inequality among local 
governments and consequently the livelihood of the residents.   
4.3 Deficient Mechanism for Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
Inter-governmental funds transfers are largely characterized by many challenges that are widely felt by both local 
governments and central government institutions. Central government transfers different types of funds to local 
governments including local governments subsidy, funds for decentralized services of education and health 
(Service Decentralization Model) which are introduced in number of districts, and Local Development Fund (LDF), 
of which the latter two are part of Joint Program for Local governance (JPLG). 
JPLG program introduced by starting decentralization with Service Delivery Model (SDM) supported by UNICEF 
where minimum functions of education and health transferred to number of local governments.  Keeping business 
as usual, sector ministries started budgeting allocations to support designated local governments. These funds are 
under the vote of respective ministries (health and education) However, due to the lack of developed transfer 
mechanism, the process of transferring fund from vote of respective ministries to local governments goes through 
long way. Each ministry prepares expenditure warrant to regions of allocated districts, then regional education 
officer or regional medical officer withdraws funds from regional accountant general through payment voucher 
where the payee may be regional officer and pays then to respective local government. These redundant processes 
are time consuming, inefficient, and many times ineffective. 
Local authorities claimed irregularities in these including bank deductions and delays where Ministry of Finance 
claims about tax deductions not returned and lack of financial reports from local governments at all. Interviewed 
experts stressed that the root cause of such irregularities and inefficiencies to be fragmented system primarily 
coming from policy and the legal framework. 
 4.4. Legal Challenges  
The Constitution of Somaliland provides a framework for a decentralized system of governments. Local 
governments were given the primary responsibility for service delivery at the local level according to their ability. 
Mal (2017) concluded there exists poor legislation and capacity problem in local governments. Mohamoud (2012)  
also pointed out legal conflict regarding ill-defined demarcation of taxes to be collected by local government and 
central government, and to some extend borders of new districts not defined Legal and regulatory framework were 
not reviewed based on assessment of local government capacities  to deliver functional of service delivery 
assignment between local governments and central government.  
4.5. Limited Capacity and Transparency  
Financial management practices are below average standard and they use very old fashioned and errorous manuals 
( (Mohamoud, 2012).  Mayors also showed the challenge of limited skilled staff in local governments. Moreover, 
sector ministries of health and education have limited capacity in systems and regional offices in particular. The 
research team found it difficult in finding the financial plans of local governments, the budgets of local governmens 
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are not publicly disclosed. It’s also currently difficult getting information about work plan and budget for 
decentralized services of education and health from local governments that shows and clearly indicate how the 
three different sources of funds are to disbursed (Ministry of education/health, UNICEF, local government).  
Elected district authorities to be accountable to local communities/constituents face so many challenges primarily 
budget constraints and inadequate funding (Ahmed, 2016). However, key respondents in this study thematically 
reasoned that concerned authorities showed poor leadership quality to use allocated resources to address existing 
challenges.  
5.0 Conclusion and Recommended Better Ways for Fiscal Decentralization 
5.1. conclusion 
The number of districts has been increased unnecessarily based on tribal politics. Break-away districts are unable 
to provide basic services due to their limited taxable economic base and resources mobilization. All grade D 
districts depend on electoral districts to exercise their voting rights but elected council do not represent them in 
district council as they have appointed council of mayor, deputy mayor, and executive secretary.  
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are not fairly distributed as they are not based on assessed criteria. Most districts 
do not get municipal tax revenues which may cause budget disparity among local governments. If decentralization 
is fully adopted under this situation of revenue inequality among local governments some local governments will 
end up with relatively smaller local revenue that will more likely have negative future consequences on their 
livelihoods.  
In Somaliland, the democratization is yet clear institutionally set-up and rarely analyzed the impact of macro 
policies on subnational governments. The fiscal decentralization has not been considered and discussed as a 
macropolitical level. The Government needs to consider decentralization itself as a reform and choose which 
modality of decentralization should it go. Districts are characterized by poor public financial management practices 
which makes them less transparent and less accountable.  Therefore, there is a need to reconsider public sector 
reforms reach local governments and in the near future coordinate the ongoing three reforms in public financial 
management, decentralization, and civil service. Also, Legal and regulatory framework were not reviewed based 
on assessment of local government capacities to deliver functional of service delivery assignment between local 
governments and central government. There is also need to open broader policy debates on functional assignments 
and budget allocations for local governments to develop comprehensive and blueprint strategic policies and legal 
framework in fiscal decentralization reform and make a close coordination with other reforms.  
5.2. Recommends for Somaliland’s Fiscal Decentralization 
To find well suited coherence of the objectives of decentralization and mechanisms for implementation, this paper 
recommends to study the design of fiscal decentralization that is contextualized to be consistent with the 
institutional set up and design government structure. Government shall rethink about planning and implementing 
policies of subnational governments that solves the proliferated politically appointed districts and then review 
regulatory framework in terms of assignment of functions and responsibilities between central government and 
subnational governments. From there, study and design physical and socioeconomic factors that dictate the 
allocation formula and use of intergovernmental transfers.  
Somaliland should decide which type of fiscal decentralization it adopts giving considerate attention to the extent 
to which local governments autonomy to decide revenue and expenditure allocations, appropriate assignment of 
expenditure and revenues (tax demarcations) between central governments and local governments should reflect 
best practices.  
For successful implementation fiscal decentralization should be part of comprehensive framework of government 
but has not to come in isolation (Hobdari et al., 2018). The gradual progress of decentralization must go along with 
related reforms in strengthening public finance management systems and civil service reforms. With respect to the 
theories and experience of implemented countries, its strongly recommended that Government expenditures are 
made as clearly as possible to avoid overlap of resources and challenges in legal mandates arising from duplication 
of authority and will also likely increase accountability.  
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